Posibles aportaciones de los sistemas electorales de Estados de estructura compuesta a nuestro modelo electoral

Abstract

Two alternative electoral systems proposed by political sources are analyzed in order to review our current pattern. The first one is the German electoral model of double voting. Among its advantages, it is necessary to highlight that it is proportional, as the resulting number of seats is determined by the votes of the list. But this system modulates the results at the same time because a percentage of deputies are elected by direct vote, provided they win their respective constituencies. Such a model is more satisfactory for voters since it gives them the possibility of deciding the precise candidate’s name, and allows for a greater demand for political accountability as well. It would be possible to follow it without amending the Spanish Constitution. Nevertheless, it would be advisable to opt for its reform in order to achieve a suitable system, especially since the Constitution’s most protected part is not affected. Regarding the Spanish regional level, such as the Comunidad de Madrid, it would be necessary, from a legal point of view, to carry out the reform of the relevant Statute of Autonomy. Other two very controversial issues should be taken into account: On the one hand, the uniformity in the size of constituencies and, on the other hand, cut constituencies (gerrymandering), made in order to obtain some electoral advantage.